

‘PIGS’ Go To Market: Are People of Southern European Descent Discriminated Against in Northern European Job Markets?

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of recession and the Euro debt crisis, negative stereotypes about Southern Europeans have been (re)activated across Northern European countries. Because these stereotypes make explicit reference to productivity-relevant traits, they have the potential to influence employers’ hiring decisions. Using a sub-sample of data from the GEMM study, we investigate the responses of over 3,000 firms based in Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, to identical (fictitious) young applicants born to Greek, Spanish and Italian parents. We find significant -and often severe- levels of hiring discrimination against applicants of Southern European descent in Norway and the Netherlands but not in Germany. Our analysis further suggests employers’ preferences for applicants with ‘native’ (non-migrant) heritage -over everybody else- is the driving force of discrimination in Norway, while discrimination in the Netherlands seems driven by a mechanism of targeted rejection of Greek and Spanish (but not Italian) descendants, which appears consistent with existing negative stereotypes. We argue differences in discrimination estimates and discrimination types across countries could respond to the combination of specific migration histories, the degree of regulation over hiring procedures, and the specific dynamics of negative stereotyping unleashed by the Euro debt crisis.

KEYWORDS: Hiring Discrimination; Southern Europeans; Second Generation; Northern Europe; Stereotypes; Migration Histories; Ingroup Favoritism; Targeted Discrimination; Placebo Test; Euro Debt Crisis; GEMM study

INTRODUCTION

Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish migration to Northern Europe has traditionally been associated with a high degree of ‘invisibility’ (see e.g. Eremenko et al. 2017; Favell 2008; 2013; Tesser and Dronkers 2007).¹ Though not immune from xenophobic and paternalistic attitudes, Southern European guest workers participating in the post-war reconstruction of countries such as Belgium, France, and Germany, were considered as culturally similar and more ‘integratable’ in comparison with non-European laborers (Schönwälder 2004). Many of these guest workers settled permanently and raised their children in their new home countries. Examples of successful second-generation Southern Europeans born to postwar migrants abound in all types of activities, from arts and sports to politics and business, across Northern European countries, where Southern-European guest workers and their descendants have often been depicted as a “model minority” (e.g. in Switzerland) and enjoyed a privileged position in the existing ethnic hierarchies (see e.g. Strijbis and Polavieja 2018; Wimmer 2013). Today, both public discourse and scientific inquiry on

¹ Throughout this paper, we use the terms “Northern Europe” and “Northern European countries” to refer to Western European countries north of the Iberian and Italian peninsulas, from France and Switzerland to Scandinavian (Nordic) countries.

migrants' incorporation in Europe is mostly focused on third-country nationals and their descendants, particularly groups having African, Asian, or Muslim roots, as well as on Eastern Europeans, while paying little attention to the outcomes of people of Southern-European descent (but see Algan et al. 2010; Heath 2007).²

Lack of attention to Southern Europeans in the immigrant incorporation literature may itself respond to the new dynamics of European mobility set in motion after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which established freedom of movement and residence for persons in the EU as the cornerstone of European citizenship. Unlike their guest-worker predecessors of the mid-twentieth century, contemporary South-North EU movers are often university-educated and can move and work freely in a borderless Union (Favell 2008). Before the Euro debt crisis, their presence in Northern European countries was not explicitly targeted by xenophobic public discourse, while their status as EU citizens granted them legal rights and symbolic protection against their being categorized as 'migrants' in their destination countries.³ Instead, these highly-qualified new EU movers embodied the ideal of a truly European citizenry emboldened by the European integration project. Southern Europeans in Northern Europe have thus for long been a 'non-issue'.

In the aftermath of the Great Recession, however, growing migration flows from the South to the North became increasingly politicized, while the Euro debt crisis unleashed a plethora of resentful stereotypes about the alleged 'national character' of Southern Europeans across the Northern European media and political discourse (see Golec de Zavala et al.; 2017 Sierp and Karner 2017). Negative stereotyping of Southern Europeans was particularly intense in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, as both the media and the political elites adopted a decidedly moralistic overtone in their discussions over the Greek and Portuguese bailout funds, and the Spanish banking bailout. Growing migration inflows from Southern Europe were also highly politicized in the context of the Brexit campaign, which placed migration at the very centre of the debate (see Godwin and Milazzo 2017). Record levels of hate crimes, including several episodes of violence against Southern Europeans, were reported in the UK following the 2016 referendum (see e.g. BBC 2019; González and Martínez 2016). Even in Norway, a country outside the EU with comparatively small migration inflows from the South, the mainstream media raised concerns about increasing numbers of "Euro-refugees" "fleeing the South to work in the North" (Bygnes 2015). Today, there is growing academic interest in the dynamics of intra-European inequalities and a certain consensus has emerged, at least amongst researchers in the ethnic boundary tradition, that previously 'invisible' or latent intra-European boundaries and hierarchies might be gaining in salience as a result of these multiple European crises (see e.g. Antonucci and Varriale 2019; Favell 2013). Despite these claims, however, there is a dearth of empirical research on new intra-European ethnic boundaries and on how these boundaries affect the distribution of socio-economic opportunities in European societies.

To fill this gap, we draw on a subsample of data from the GEMM study, the largest harmonized field experiment on ethnic discrimination in hiring ever conducted in Europe (Lancee et al. 2019), to test whether young German, Dutch and Norwegian nationals of Italian, Greek and Spanish descent are discriminated against when looking for employment in their respective countries.⁴

² With the exception perhaps of Germany's 'ethnic puzzle' regarding the supposed lack of integration of second-generation Italian migrants, especially with regards to educational attainment (Kalter and Granato 2007; Kirsten and Granato 2007).

³ We note Eastern Europeans did not enjoy this privileged status.

⁴ The GEMM study also includes Britain. Yet the overall callback rate in the British experiment is comparatively low (approximately 17%, compared to 28% in Norway, 46% in the Netherlands and 48% in Germany). This raises

Because access to employment is a crucial determinant of people's life-chances, discrimination in hiring can be a very important source of socio-economic inequality. We hypothesize existing stereotypes about Northern and southern Europeans' respective 'national characters' can be particularly influential in shaping employers' hiring decisions in a context of incomplete information because these stereotypes typically emphasize traits that are relevant for productivity (i.e. contentiousness/idleness, trustworthiness/dishonesty, competence/negligence, improvidence/foresight, etc.). By investigating whether country nationals of Southern-European parentage are discriminated against when looking for jobs in Northern Europe, we test for a potential source of intra-European ethnic inequality previously overlooked in both the ethnic-boundary and the labor-market stratification literatures.

To clarify the contribution of this study, it is important to discuss upfront what we *cannot* do. First, because we have no comparable research on hiring discrimination against Southern Europeans prior to the present study, we cannot test whether discrimination has been *enhanced* by recent political events and dynamics. We *suspect* such events and dynamics, by reinforcing negative productivity-relevant stereotypes, have had real consequences for the employment chances of Europeans of Southern European descent, but we can only test whether discrimination against Southern European descendants *exists* today in each of the three countries studied, not whether discrimination has *increased*. Second, while our field experiment allows us to observe –and to measure– the outcomes of employers' hiring decisions in real-life settings, we cannot observe the mental processes that guide such decisions. In other words, the role of stereotypes as triggers of discrimination can only be tested *indirectly* in field-experimental research. In this study we test not only if Southern European descendants receive fewer callbacks by employers than identical applicants of native descent, which is the standard measure of ethnic discrimination in field-experimental research, but also whether our discrimination estimates are driven by a mechanism of in-group favoritism –whereby employers simply favor applicants of native descent— or are the result of employers' specific rejection of applicants of Greek, Italian, and/or Spanish descent. We stress that only the latter form of discrimination, which we call targeted discrimination, is consistent with processes of negative stereotyping —which, we argue, were more common in Eurozone lending countries. This is the closest we can get to unearthing employers' decision-making processes in this study. Finally, it is important to note that, although the fully harmonized nature of the GEMM study allows us to compare discrimination estimates across countries, the three-country scope of our data means we cannot causally identify the effect of any specific national variable. What we can do, however, is formulate several theoretically-informed empirical expectations about which country contexts can potentially produce higher levels of discrimination against Southern European descendants and then test whether the results of the GEMM experiment are consistent with these expectations. To formulate our predictions, we take into consideration the following three factors: 1) the political climate affecting the dynamics of negative stereotyping; 2) the specific migration histories of each 'minority' group in each country; and 3) some well-known country differences in the degree of institutional regulation of the job application process. We link all these macro-level dimensions to employers' micro-level hiring decisions by drawing on insights from social and cognitive psychology, sociology and economics.

FRAMEWORK

Social psychologists and cognitive scientists note the deep-seated cognitive disposition of humans to perceive others as members of “natural kinds” with inherited and immutable “essences”

concerns about statistical power for detecting discrimination against the 'minority' groups of interest in this study, none of which were oversampled in the original harmonized GEMM experiment.

(Hirschfeld 1996; Gil-White 2001; Brubaker 2009). This cognitive disposition provides the psychological foundations of social categorization and stereotyping, which constitute the building blocks of prejudice and discrimination. Social categorization is a cognitively-biased mental process that reduces individuals to mere representatives of an assumed stereotyped core, which purportedly defines a social collective (Sierp and Karner 2017). While the process of categorizing others seems hard-wired in our cognitive functions, the actual content of the stereotypes used for social categorization (i.e. the attributes that form the constitutive essence of the categorized group) is defined by, and transmitted through, complex social processes that are historically contingent and reflect specific conflicts about symbolic and material resources (Bonacich 1972; Hardin 1995).

The activation (or re-emergence) of regional stereotypes in Europe must thus be understood in the context of intra-European economic inequalities and political struggles over the allocation of resources, decision-making power and the reconfiguration of new institutional structures (Sierp and Karner 2017). Within this context, contemporary researchers are increasingly studying how public and political discourse, particularly in times of crisis, categorizes some Europeans (and their governments) as disciplined, honest, frugal and hard-working while labelling others as corrupt, lazy, extravagant, or backward (Adler-Nissen 2017; Chalániová 2013). The ‘PIGS’ moniker, which gained currency in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, captured this discursive moment by implying a common label of failure and backwardness to the economies and societies of Portugal, Italy/Ireland, Greece and Spain (Capucha et al. 2014; Van Vossle 2016). Such categorization processes draw on essentialist logic by invoking cultural traits and even biological-phenotypical distinctions as the basis for difference (Fox et al. 2012; Mylonas and Noutsou 2017). A recent illustrative example of intra-European stereotyping can be seen in the polemical cover of the Dutch right-wing weekly magazine Elsevier, published in the midst of discord over the European Covid-19 Recovery Fund under the headline “Not another penny for Southern Europe” (see Figure 1).⁵ The cover contrasted blond-haired, individuals performing skilled labour and professional activities, depicting the ‘industrious North’, with dark-haired individuals engaging in frivolous pool-side and terrace activities, depicting the ‘leisurely South’.

<Figure 1 about here>

Examples of negative stereotyping of Southern Europeans in Northern European media and political discourse abound (see e.g. van Hecke 2015; Heinrich & Stahl 2015; Van Vossle 2016). Yet, by themselves, these examples do not constitute sufficient *evidence* of the emergence of new ethnic boundaries. Negative stereotypes could be part of a harmless cultural ‘game’ Europeans have been playing together for centuries, or may even be counteracted by positive stereotypes, which also exist —e.g. valorizing ‘Mediterranean culture/civilization’ (see e.g. Mylonas and Noutsou 2017). Boundaries are not *just* symbolic/discursive phenomena but must have *real* consequences for people’s life chances. Thus, in order for the ‘boundary approach’ to be analytically useful, we must find evidence that boundaries act as mechanisms of social-closure, limiting individuals’ opportunities to access material resources (Brubaker 2009; Connor and Koenig 2013). Under this light, employers’ hiring decisions become a crucial site for the study of boundary-making processes because these decisions have the potential to favor/restrict individuals’ access to gainful employment.

Discrimination: mechanisms and empirical predictions

⁵ A few weeks before the publication of the EW cover, Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra publicly called for a EU investigation into Spain’s proclaimed lack of budgetary capacity to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic, a statement subsequently qualified as “mean”, “repugnant” and “contrary to the spirit of the EU” by the Portuguese Prime Minister, Antonio Costa.

Employers never have full and accurate information about a candidate's potential productivity and therefore hiring decisions always involve contractual risks. Employers will seek to reduce these risks by factoring in any signal that they consider relevant for assessing applicants' potential productivity. This is when stereotypes can have real consequences for people's employment opportunities. As discussed above, stereotypes are an essential part of categorical thinking, a cognitive process whereby perceivers, rather than considering individuals as unique constellations of qualities and predispositions, construe them on the basis of "social categories", to which fixed stereotypical attributes are attached (Allport 1954; Devine 1989; Fiske and Neuberg 1990). Research in psychology suggests categorical thinking is largely an automatic mental process (see Devine 1989 and discussion in Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000).

Job applicants are, of course, multiply categorizable targets. Yet categories that emphasize productivity-relevant traits are likely to have an "activation advantage" over other categories in the hiring processes (for a discussion of category activation see Bodenhausen and Macrae 1998). Cognitively unsophisticated employers will be particularly prone to engage in *folk inferencing* (to paraphrase Hirschfeld 1996). This is an *irrational* form of thinking whereby perceivers assume all members of a given social category (e.g. 'Germans'), to which a defining attribute has been associated (e.g. 'hard-working'), possess the same average value of such attribute (i.e. *all Germans are hard-working*).⁶ Basing hiring decisions on such irrational forms of folk inferencing will inevitably lead to employment discrimination. It is important to note, however, that the effects of social categorization on hiring decisions will not be restricted to irrational forms of thinking alone. If employers believe people belonging to a specific social category are less qualified, reliable, or committed *on average* (as compared to the average 'majority' applicant), they will still discriminate against members of this group. In this latter case, stereotypes affect hiring decisions by influencing employers' beliefs about the distribution of productivity-relevant traits across categorized social groups (i.e. by leading them to think e.g. that German descendants are more hard-working *on average* than e.g. Greek descendants). This idea was explicitly stated in Phelps' (1972) original theory of statistical discrimination —albeit posterior formulations of statistical discrimination theory in economics have been less attentive to the role of stereotypes. Phelps' theory stressed statistical discrimination is fully consistent with *rational* processes of profit maximization in contexts of incomplete information. This implies rational employers will continue discriminating people from a given categorized social group until new contradicting information about the group's average qualities becomes available to them —provided acquiring such information is not too costly (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973). Negative stereotypes can thus be trumped by (more) accurate information. Prior positive first-hand experience with members of the categorized group can provide such counteracting information to employers who will then dismiss existing negative stereotypes. This is why positive intergroup social contact can reduce prejudice and discrimination (see e.g. Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998).

In-group favoritism or targeted outgroup rejection?

We note discrimination against any outgroup, e.g. Southern-European descendants, could be driven by two distinctive mechanisms: 1) in-group favoritism and 2) targeted outgroup

⁶ Note discrimination that follows from folk-inferences is different from taste-based discrimination as formulated by Becker (1957). Becker's employers are irrational because their hiring decisions are entirely based on their negative (positive) attitudes towards the outgroup (ingroup) and not on productivity considerations. In contrast, employers who draw on stereotype-based folk-inferences are irrational because they ignore that variation around the mean is a universal feature of all population distributions —so that e.g. all Germans cannot possibly be hard-working.

discrimination. In-group favoritism, also known as ethnic homophily, can be defined as the well-observed human tendency to identify with and favor proximate and similar others (in-groups) over distant and dissimilar ones (outgroups) (see e.g. LeVine and Campbell 1973; Brown 2000; Hornsey 2008). Ethnic homophily could tilt employers' decisions towards applicants with 'native' surnames against all other applicants in the application pool, regardless of the latter's specific ancestry. Note that in this case applicants of Southern European descent would still be discriminated against, though not due to any negative stereotypes about them in particular. As a mechanism, in-group favoritism is thus not consistent with the activation of negative stereotypes on Southern Europeans. In contrast, targeted discrimination implies employers discriminate against a specific ethnic group, which is precisely what we should expect if negative stereotypes of Southern Europeans in particular play a role in Northern employers' hiring decisions.

A placebo test

To distinguish between these two types of discrimination, we compare employer responses to applicants of both native and Southern-European descent with their responses to identical applicants of French descent. France, like Italy, Greece and Spain, is a Mediterranean country and a member of the Eurozone. Yet due to its larger and more solid economy, France was much better able to shoulder the impact of the Great Recession. Because French descendants are culturally close to Southern European descendants (particularly to those speaking Romance languages) but may be subject to fewer negative connotations in the current European political context, they can be used as a *placebo* treatment in our analysis.⁷ The logic of our test is simple: if we find similar levels of discrimination against French descendants as we do for Southern European descendants, we will not be able to conclude that discrimination against the latter is driven by negative productivity-relevant stereotypes unbridled in the context of the Euro debt crisis. The only empirical result that would be consistent with an effect of targeted negative stereotyping is one where Southern European descendants are discriminated against but identical applicants of French descent are not. Only this latter finding could be interpretable as *indirect* but *consistent* evidence of stereotyped-driven discrimination. Note also that, if negative stereotypes unleashed in the aftermath of the Euro debt crisis are the main driving mechanism of discrimination, we should find higher levels of discrimination against people of Greek and Spanish descent, compared to those of Italian descent, given that Greece and Spain, as recipients of bailout packages, were at the epicenter of the political debates surrounding the Eurozone crisis, whereas Italy was not. The distinction between bailed-out and non-bailed out countries may thus be crucial in this context.

Cross national expectations

We expect discrimination against Southern European descendants to vary across the three countries of our experiment (Germany, Netherlands and Norway) along three main dimensions: 1) the political climate; 2) the specific migration histories of each 'minority' group in each country; and 3) the degree of institutional regulation of the hiring process. As noted above, although we cannot *causally* identify the effect of any of these dimensions individually, together they provide the theoretical underpinnings of our cross-country expectations. We discuss these dimensions in turn.

Political climate

⁷ As for any nationality in Europe, negative stereotypes about the French abound, but we suspect such stereotypes have no bearing on employers' hiring decisions because they are not construed on productivity-relevant traits.

The political climate is expected to affect the intensity of negative stereotyping against Southern Europeans. The GEMM experiment was carried out over a period of 18 months, from 2016 to 2018. This period captures the aftermath of the Euro debt crisis. As discussed above, there is evidence that the Eurozone crisis reinforced negative stereotypes about Southern Europeans in Northern European media. The German and Dutch contexts have particular relevance as the two Eurozone countries (together with Finland and Austria) that most clearly championed severe austerity measures in exchange for partial (Spain) or total bailout funds (Portugal and Greece) at the time. It is in this specific political context (i.e. the Eurozone crisis) that negative stereotypes about Southern Europeans were most clearly activated and used politically to blame bailed-out countries (categorized as improvident and leisurely) for their misfortunes. Because Norway is not part of the EU, the Eurozone debt crisis did not impose major costs or risks for Norwegian taxpayers. As a result, Norway's political climate may have been less prone to fostering targeted stereotypes against Southern Europeans. Although, as mentioned above, the Norwegian media might have voiced concerns about increasing migration inflows from the South, to our knowledge, these concerns were not accompanied by negative stereotypes about the 'national characters' of Southern Europeans.

Migration histories

Positive stereotypes for long-established ethnic groups could protect them from the effects of a strained intra-European political climate. As discussed above, Southern Europeans have largely enjoyed a good reputation in old migration countries that received an important influx of guest workers from the south after WWII. Estimates of the numbers of migrants that left Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million (Bonifazi 2008; Okólski 2012; Van Mol & de Valk 2016). The preferred destinations of these migrants were West Germany, France, Switzerland and Belgium, while the largest migration inflows came from Italy and Spain (followed by Greece). Germany is the country with the largest population of second-generation Southern Europeans in both absolute and, for our dataset, also in relative terms. Southern European descendants make the second largest second-generation ethnic group in Germany after Turkish descendants (Algan et al. 2010). The Netherlands, on the other hand, met most of its post-war labor demands through migrants from its former colonies and, although a non-negligible inflow of Southern European guest workers joined the foreign-born Dutch workforce in the 1960s, most of these workers returned to their home countries (Teseer and Dronkers 2007). As a result, there are no Southern European countries in the top-ten ancestry countries for people of foreign descent (*allochtonen*) in the Netherlands (Ersanili 2007). Norway is a new immigration country outside the European Union (and thus also the Eurozone) and has never been a traditional destination for Southern Europeans.

In accordance with social contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998), we should expect the existence of long-established and sizeable minorities to increase the possibilities for positive social contact. In countries where Southern European minorities are well-established (Germany), employers will be more likely to have first-hand experience with Southern European descendants which may counteract the negative stereotypes embolden by a strained intra-European political climate.

Institutional regulation of the hiring processes

In their comprehensive meta-analysis of correspondence tests on hiring discrimination in OECD countries, Zschrint and Ruedin (2016) demonstrate German-speaking countries show consistently

lower rates of ethnic discrimination.⁸ They attribute this finding to the highly regulated nature of application procedures in these countries. Job applications in German-speaking countries typically require, not only a CV, photograph and cover letter, but crucially also official education and training reports (report cards, university transcripts, diplomas, etc.), as well as reference letters from former employers. Such detailed and standardized application packages are expected to reduce the scope for statistical discrimination by reinforcing the reliability of the productivity signals included in applicants' résumés (Zschrint and Ruedin 2016).

Table 1 summarizes cross-country differences across the three macro-level dimensions considered for Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. Based on these differences, we expect hiring discrimination against Southern Europeans to be particularly high in the Netherlands, as this country combines intense negative stereotyping against Southern European countries, a low presence of second-generation Southern European communities (i.e. low chance for positive counteracting social contact), and unregulated application procedures (i.e. less reliable productivity signals). Discrimination in Germany should be significantly less intense given its long-established (and traditionally well-regarded) communities of Southern Europeans and because detailed application packages reduce the scope for statistical discrimination for all minorities. Both characteristics should reduce targeted discrimination against Southern Europeans in Germany, even in the face of negative media stereotyping and moralistic political discourse. We also expect discrimination against Southern Europeans (targeted rejection) to be lower in Norway than in the Netherlands because, as a non-EU country, negative stereotyping of Southern Europeans was probably less common in the Norwegian media and politics in the first place.⁹ We thus expect targeted (stereotype-driven) discrimination against Southern European descendants to be lower in Norway than in the Netherlands. We note, however, our discussion does not allow us to predict clear differences in the levels of targeted discrimination between Germany and Norway, because we cannot assess beforehand which of the three dimensions considered in our discussion has greater empirical import. Finally, we also expect differences in discrimination by specific country of Southern European ancestry. As discussed above, the nature of the Eurozone crisis implied bailed-out countries (and their governments) were the main targets of negative stereotyping in public and political discourse. Thus, we expect larger targeted discrimination against Greek and Spanish descendants compared to Italian descendants, as Italy never required a bailout.

<Table 1 about here>

DESIGN, DATA AND METHODS

Measuring discrimination

Employers' hiring decisions are seldom observed *directly* –the mental processing behind such decisions can even be obscure to employers themselves (see Devine 1989; Fiske 1998). But we can detect discrimination by observing the outcomes of such decisions by means of a controlled experiment in real-world settings. The most developed field-experiments on hiring discrimination are the so-called correspondence (or résumé) tests. In correspondence tests researchers send

⁸ Zschrint and Ruedin (2016) meta-analyze the findings of 738 correspondence tests of ethnic discrimination in hiring in 43 separate studies conducted in OECD countries from 1990 to 2015.

⁹ Note that our characterization of national media portrayals of Southern Europeans in each country of this study is unavoidably speculative since there is no externally-validated source of comparable data on negative stereotyping in the European media we can draw on.

fictitious job applications to real job vacancies and record employers' callbacks as measures of employers' interest in each candidate. Fictitious applicants are identical in all relevant characteristics but the treatment/s of interest. Randomization of the treatment/s allows us to attribute any significant difference in employers' callback to treatment effects (see e.g. Jackson and Cox 2013). This way, we can identify discrimination even if we cannot observe firms' decision-making processes directly (see Pager 2007; Zschrint and Ruedin 2016; Quillian et al. 2017). Given their experimental design, field-experiments achieve high levels of internal (causal) validity. They also provide much higher levels of external validity (generalizability) than lab experiments because they are applied to real-life settings. By capitalizing on the strengths of experimental and observational methods, field-experiments provide the strongest basis for studying hiring discrimination.

We draw on a sub-sample of data from the GEMM study, the largest field-experiment on ethnic discrimination in hiring conducted in Europe to date (Lancee et al. 2019). Our analytical sample includes the responses of roughly 3,600 firms to the same number of fictitious applications (cover letter and CVs), which were sent to real vacant jobs advertised online in Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. The experiment was conducted over a time span of two years, from 2016 to 2018.¹⁰ As in Ahmed et al. (2013) and Weichselbaumer (2017), we used an unpaired design and sent one application to each vacancy. Unpaired designs allow researchers to test multiple treatments simultaneously, while minimizing both detection risks and harm to employers. Unpaired designs also avoid potential issues of induced competition bias (for a discussion on unpaired designs, see Vuolo et al., 2018; Larsen 2020). Our data cover national labor markets for the same seven chosen occupations (see below) and this allows us to estimate *average employer behavior* within countries. The study at hand tests 1) whether applicants of Southern European descent have equal hiring opportunities when compared to applicants of native descent in each of the three countries of the experiment; and, if not, 2) whether observed callback patterns are consistent with targeted (stereotype-driven) discrimination or with a mechanism of in-group favoritism.

Our data include the responses of between 1,000 (Germany and Norway) and 1,500 (Netherlands) firms in each country. All these firms searched for job candidates using high-traffic online platforms to fill vacancies in seven selected occupations, which were carefully chosen to provide variation in skills and customer contact.¹¹ Together, these occupations cover between 15 and 20 percent of the workforce within each country. Our fictitious job applications include fixed characteristics, which were identical across applicants for the same occupation, and randomized treatments.

Fixed characteristics

All fictitious applicants are citizens of —and have obtained all their education and working experience in— the country of study (Germany, Netherlands or Norway).¹² Education varies as

¹⁰ The GEMM study was approved by the relevant ethics committee in each participant country and abides the requirements of the International Sociological Association Code of Ethics, the European Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice and the ethical standards and guidelines of Horizon 2020. This includes ensuring confidentiality of all human participants and ensuring no harm comes to the participants (see Lanece et al 2019:24-26).

¹¹ The seven occupations are: cook, hairdresser, payroll clerk, receptionist, sales representative, software developer and store assistant.

¹² Half of our applicants are 2nd generation migrants (i.e. were born in the country of study). The other half were born in their respective countries of ancestry (Spain, Greece, or Italy) migrated at the age of six (i.e. generation 1.5). Migration status does not seem to affect employers' responses in any of the analysed countries (available upon request).

required for each occupation, while working experience is fixed to four years in the same sector of the job vacancy for all occupations (all applicants report having worked for two different companies in this period). Because there are obvious differences in the length of schooling required for each occupation, the age of our applicants varies from 22 to 28 (being fixed for all applicants within each occupation).

Randomized treatments

Ancestry. The key treatment of this experiment is country of ancestry, which is defined as the country of origin of job applicants' parents. The GEMM study included a total of 44 different ancestries (see Lancee et al. 2019), which were randomly assigned to each application within the following strata: 25% applicants of native ancestry, 25% for the two most representative minorities in each country, and 50% randomly assigned to 31 different ancestries. All the non-native ancestries used in the present study come from this latter stratum. We use a total of 5 non-native ancestries, 3 Southern European ancestries, 1 'benchmark' ancestry, and 1 'placebo' ancestry. Southern European ancestries are: *Greek*, *Spanish*, and *Italian*. The benchmark ancestry is *Sub-Saharan African*, which includes applicants of Nigerian and Ugandan parents. We chose this latter ancestry as benchmark because we know Sub-Saharan descendants are one of the most strongly discriminated groups across Europe and thus provide an obvious yardstick with which to compare the intensity of the other discrimination estimates (Polavieja et al. 2020). Finally, we use French-descendants as a placebo ancestry. As explained above, the use of this ancestry is expected to allow us to distinguish between in-group favoritism and targeted outgroup rejection as two distinct drivers of ethnic discrimination. The analytical sample of this study includes a total of 921 applications of non-native ancestry (roughly 150 for each single national group) plus over 2,600 native applications (total N=3,596). This imbalance produces no estimation bias but implies that standard errors around parameter estimates for non-native descendants are large for single national groups (see below).

In our application packages, country of ancestry was indicated using three simultaneous signals: First, naming applicants using typical family and first names for the majority population at each country of ancestry. We chose names that were popular, recognizable as male or female and free from class connotations (see Table 2 for the list of chosen names). Second, in addition to the respective home country language, a second mother tongue, e.g. "Italian (mother tongue)" was explicitly signaled in the skills section of the applicant's CV. Finally, because names (and languages) are often imprecise signals of specific national origin, the cover letter contains a statement that the family of the job candidate migrated from the ancestry country to the region of the advertised job. All these three signals combined should convey clear information on country of ancestry.

Gender. Applicants are randomly assigned a male or female name and their gender (male or female) is explicitly indicated in the CV. Because gender is orthogonal to ancestry it needs not be controlled for in our statistical models.

<Table 2 about here>

Outcome variable

Callback: The key outcome variable for field-experiments on hiring discrimination is of course employers' callbacks. This is a binary variable differentiating positive response (signal of interest) from negative response (no signal of interest) to each application. Firms can indicate their interest in our applicants in three different ways. First, they can issue a formal invitation to the job candidate for an interview (*invitation*); second, they can inform the applicant that they have passed an early selection process (*pre-selection*); and, third, employers can request specific additional information or ask the applicant to be called back, thus revealing interest in the candidate (*interest*). We take all three responses as positive signals of interest. The category 'No signal of interest' includes both explicit rejections of the job application or lack of response 12 weeks after the application is sent (automatic confirmation of receipt is not considered a signal of interest). To minimize harm to employers, we promptly and politely declined any invitation to a job interview or request to provide additional information.

Estimation

We test whether applicants of Southern European descent are discriminated against in each of the countries of the experiment by estimating country-specific logistic and linear probability regression models with controls for occupational skill requirements.¹³ We regress employer callbacks on applicant ancestry using applicants of native-born parents as the reference category. The ancestry coefficients provide an estimate of average differences in callback probabilities within each country, with associated standard errors. To better gauge the magnitude of our estimates, we also provide callback ratios (CBR) for significant ancestries. The CBR is the proportion of applicants of native descent that receive a positive response by employers relative to the proportion applicants of foreign descent that receive a positive response. We calculate CBRs for Southern European ancestries, as well as for French and African descendants.

We use three different specifications depending on the degree of (dis)aggregation of the Southern European category: In the first models, all Southern European descendants are grouped together and their average callback is compared to that of natives; in the second model, we split Southern European descendants into two groups: those associated with bailed-out countries (Greece and Spain), which were the main targets of negative stereotyping in the aftermath of the Euro debt crisis, and those with ancestry in Italy (not bailed-out); finally, in model 3, the three Southern European ancestries are tested separately against applicants of native descent. We note this latter model will yield large standard errors due to small-n (as we have roughly 50 observations per country of Southern European ancestry for each country of the experiment) and this increases the chances of Type II error (i.e. failing to capture a true significant effect). Caution is thus recommended when interpreting significance tests in the most disaggregated specification. As explained above, all models include additional callback estimates for applicants of African (benchmark) and French (placebo) descent, which will help us interpret the magnitude and the nature of discrimination against Southern European descendants.

RESULTS

Table 3 below presents the results of fitting the first model (where all Southern European countries of descent are tested together) to each of the countries of the experiment using a logistic specification (odds ratios). We note all our results are fully replicable using linear probability models (see Appendix 1). Callback rates are shown graphically in figure 2 (panels a, b and c). The combined model already reveals three of the four main findings of this study. *First*, we find no signs of discrimination against Southern European (nor French) descendants in Germany. The extent to which this is due to the effect of positive contact with long-established Southern European minorities, exposure to positive stereotypes, or due to the more detailed and standardized application procedures in Germany, we cannot tell. We note, however, that of the three countries of study, Germany also shows the lowest levels of discrimination against African descendants (CBR=1.2), which seems consistent with the institutional interpretation of the German experiment (Zschrint and Ruedin 2016). *Second*, in contrast to Germany, we find significant levels of discrimination against Southern European descendants in both the Netherlands (CBR=1.2) and Norway (CBR=1.5). *Third*, and in line with our expectations, discrimination against Southern Europeans seems *targeted* in the Netherlands, as we find no discrimination against equivalent French descendants; whereas in Norway we find all applicants

¹³ Because treatments are randomized within occupation, controlling for occupational characteristics is unnecessary for within-country estimation. However, in order to compare discrimination estimates across countries, we must account for potential differences in the occupational structure. We do this by controlling for the skill requirements of the occupation in the regression models.

with non-native parents receive significantly fewer callbacks than identical applicants of native descent, which suggests in-group favoritism could be the main driver of discrimination in this country.

<Table 3 about here>

Targeted discrimination, according to our own argument, should penalize Greek and Spanish descendants in particular because these two countries (together with Portugal) required bailout packages and this placed them at the epicenter of the Euro debt political crisis. Table 4 below presents the results of splitting Southern European descendants into those associated with bailed-out and non-bailed-out countries, whereas Table 5 presents results fully disaggregated by country of ancestry (logistic specifications, see tables A2 and A5 for corresponding linear probability models). Callback probabilities and callback ratios (for significant treatment effects) are presented graphically in Figure 3, which combines the results from Tables 3 and 4. We note that, as expected, discrimination in the Netherlands is specifically targeted to Greek and Spanish descendants, whereas no discrimination is found for applicants of Italian descent. Discrimination by Dutch employers against these two specific Southern European ancestries seems actually sizeable, as noted specially by the magnitude of our discrimination estimate for applicants of Spanish descent (CBR=1.4), which is not too far off that found for applicants of African descent (CBR=1.5). Findings for the Dutch experiment seem fully consistent with targeted stereotype-driven discrimination. Although disaggregation makes the Norwegian picture somewhat more blurred, we still note our placebo (French descendants) and benchmark (African descendants) tests strongly suggest ethnic homophily is the main driver of discrimination in this country –even if callback estimates for Italian (CBR=1.2), and Spanish (CBR=1.4) descendants do not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Again, no signs of discrimination are found in the German experiment for any of the analyzed ancestries but African descendants. It may be interesting to note that our data show Spanish descendants receiving higher callback rates than native German descendants, while Italian descendants have lower callback rates.

<Table 4 about here>

<Table 5 about here>

<Figure 2 about here>

<Figure 3 about here>

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Intra-European political tensions surrounding the Eurozone crisis, Brexit and, more recently, the Union's response to the Covid-19 pandemic, have often been accompanied by a plethora of stereotyped media and political discourses about the different 'national characters' of Northern and Southern European societies. These discourses typically contrast an industrious north with a leisurely south. Although the (re)emergence of national stereotypes has drawn the attention of researchers in the ethnic boundary tradition, their focus has been mostly placed on the symbolic/discursive aspects of ethnic boundary making, while paying comparatively less attention to the structural dimension of ethnic boundaries —i.e. their potential to affect people's life chances through processes of social closure.

We have argued stereotyped images of leisurely Southern Europeans have social-closure potential because they stress traits that are relevant for productivity. In a context of limited information and

uncertainty about applicants' *true* qualities, employers might draw on these stereotypes to (mis)inform their hiring decisions. Our explanation of how stereotypes affect employers' decisions has built on insights from social and cognitive psychology, and statistical discrimination theory in economics, two literature strands that have too often run in parallel. Using a broader sociological perspective, we have additionally discussed under which macro-level societal conditions, stereotype-driven discrimination against Southern European job applicants is more likely to occur. We have considered three national characteristics: the political climate (as the main activator of negative stereotypes), the specific migration histories of Southern European migrants (as a potentially crucial source of stereotype-neutralizing information), and the degree of standardization of the application process (as a key factor in reducing noise around applicants' productivity signals). Two very clear empirical expectations have followed from our discussion, namely that *targeted* discrimination should be largest in the Netherlands and, relatedly, that targeted discriminations should be larger for applicants of Greek and Spanish descent (bailed-out countries) when compared to applicants of Italian descent (not bailed out).

We have tested these predictions using a sub-sample of data from the GEMM study, a uniquely harmonized source of field-experimental data to study ethnic discrimination in Europe. While randomization of treatments ensures our discrimination estimates are unbiased, small within-country sample sizes for individual foreign-ancestry groups inevitably produce large standard errors around discrimination estimates, thus reducing estimation precision. Statistical power issues notwithstanding, our results are consistent with the two main empirical predictions that followed from our theoretical model. As expected, we find the largest levels of *targeted* discrimination in the Netherlands. Dutch employers are significantly less likely to call back applicants of Greek and Spanish (but not Italian) descent when compared to applicants of native descent, whereas they show no specific aversion towards applicants of French descent, which we have used as a placebo treatment. Discrimination estimates for applicants of our two bailed-out countries are sizeable, particularly for Spanish descendants, who, according to our estimates, would have to send 45% more CVs to get the same callbacks as applicants of Dutch descent (African-ancestry applicants would have to send 50% more CVs).¹⁴ Native to Southern European callback ratios are even larger in Norway (the CBR for Greek descendants reaches 1.8), but it is important to note that, in this case, the evidence suggests discrimination is not targeted against Southern European ancestries in particular but seems to respond to a general mechanism of in-group favoritism, whereby Norwegian employers prefer applicants of Norwegian descent over everybody else. Had we not included a placebo treatment in the analysis, it would have been impossible to distinguish between targeted and untargeted discrimination, a distinction that bears great analytical import but which has seldom been addressed empirically in the field-experimental literature. We believe future discrimination research will benefit greatly from including placebo treatments in experiments' design.

Most children of Southern European migrants in Europe live in Germany. This is good news because we find no signs of discrimination against Southern European descendants in this country. We have claimed this might be partly due to the stricter job-application procedures that are typical of all German-speaking countries and partly due to the specific migration histories of Southern Europeans in Germany, which might have provided German employers with a reservoir of positive experiences and perhaps also favorable stereotypes with which to neutralize negative stereotypes coming from the media and the political arena. We note, however, all our claims about the specific drivers of cross-national differences in discrimination estimates are ultimately

¹⁴ We note our CBR estimate for Spanish descendants in the Netherlands has the same magnitude as the average White-to-African American CBR reported in the US literature. Figure based on Quillian et al.'s (2017) meta-analysis of all field-experiments on racial discrimination carried out in the US since 1989 (n=24).

speculative, as we cannot possibly identify any single macro-level effect with only three countries included in the harmonized experiment.

Alternative explanations of our findings are possible and should be acknowledged. We have placed great emphasis on the impact of recession, recession-driven south-north migration, and the Euro debt crisis as the main drivers of negative stereotyping of Southern Europeans in Northern Europe, but our discrimination estimates could admittedly respond to other sources of negative stereotyping, both proximate and distant. One such proximate source of negative stereotypes could be Northern Europeans' own knowledge of Southern European countries, typically filtered through experiences of leisure, including tourism and other forms of cultural consumption. While all three countries included as Southern European ancestries in this study are tourist magnets for Northern Europeans, Greece and Spain have specialized in 'sun & beach' tourist packages, which could reinforce stereotypical images for these groups. If the average Dutch person's idea of the typical Spaniard or Greek is based on encounters with hotel PR entertainers or fellow holiday-makers, stereotypical images of leisurely, party-going Southern Europeans may be resistant to change. Stereotypical images of Spaniards in particular could additionally be tainted with exoticized (mis)conceptions of "Hispanic" cultures more generally, which can encourage Northern employers to perceive Spanish-ancestry applicants as a more distant outgroup.¹⁵ A final alternative explanation of the origins of negative stereotypes worth considering is what we could call the long shadow of history. By this, we specifically mean the potential role of negative stereotypes construed in the context of imperial rivalries and Protestant hostility, particularly against the Spanish empire (see Greer et al. 2007). While we do not wish to deny that the so-called Spanish 'black legend' might have played a role in cementing deeply seated negative stereotypes against Spain in Protestant Europe, especially in the Netherlands, which gained independence from the Spanish crown in 1648 after the Eighty Years' War, going so far back to explaining current discrimination dynamics seems, in our view, unwarranted. The black legend might have provided a cultural sediment that favors the rooting of contemporary stereotyping dynamics, but we believe it is these contemporary dynamics, and the political struggles they express, that better explain today's intra-European ethnic boundary making processes.

¹⁵ It is important to remember that information on the specific country of descent is only given in the cover letter and we cannot tell whether all employers read all the cover letters. This makes name and language the main signals of ancestry. We note both signals are imprecise signals of country of descent for Spanish-ancestry applicants, who could thus be 'mistaken' for applicants of Latin American descent.

TABLES & FIGURES

Table 1. Summary of cross-country characteristics potentially associated with targeted discrimination propensity

Characteristics	Germany	Netherlands	Norway
Negative stereotyping in media and political discourse?	<i>Intense</i>	<i>Intense</i>	<i>Low</i>
Sizeable population of Southern European descent prior to the Great Recession and the debt crisis?	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>
Strongly regulated application procedures?	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>Expected potential for targeted discrimination...</i>	<i>Not high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Not high</i>

Table 2. Names and Number of Applications Sent per Country of the Experiment

Country of descent	Male name	Female name	Surnames	N of applications sent			
				DE	NL	NO	All
Native							
Germany (DE)	Paul	Lisa	Schneider	800			
Netherlands (NL)	Jeroen	Maaïke	De Vries		1,148		
Norway (NO)	Kristian	Silje	Hansen			727	
Southern European							
Greece (GR)	Giorgos	Konstantina	Papadopoulos/ou	51	50	42	143
Spain (ES)	Álvaro	Alba	Martínez García	46	56	44	146
Italy	Francesco	Valentina	Marino	51	57	41	149
Bailed-out (GR+ES)				97	106	86	289
Placebo treatment							
France	Guillaume	Claire	Durand	44	59	46	149
African (benchmark treatment)							
Nigeria/ Uganda	Akintunde/ Wemusa	Adeola/ Kisakye	Oladejo/ Ndikumana	138	120	76	334
Total				1,130	1,490	976	3,596

Table 3. Callback Probabilities (Odds Ratios) by Region of Descent. Southern European Descendants Combined

VARIABLES	Germany odds ratio	Netherlands odds ratio	Norway odds ratio
Descent (ref. Native)			
Southern European	0.895 [0.162]	0.706** [0.120]	0.597** [0.128]
French	0.795 [0.249]	0.792 [0.215]	0.459** [0.168]
African	0.611*** [0.115]	0.496*** [0.0995]	0.431*** [0.126]
Constant	1.287*** [0.106]	1.056 [0.0712]	0.606*** [0.0573]
Observations	1,105	1,468	970

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard Errors in brackets

Note: Models control for the skill requirements of the occupation

Table 4. Callback Probabilities (Odds Ratios) by Region of Descent. Southern European Descendants Disaggregated by Bailed-Out Status

VARIABLES	Germany odds ratio	Netherlands odds ratio	Norway odds ratio
Descent (ref. Native)			
SE bailed out (GR & ES)	1.019 [0.223]	0.572*** [0.119]	0.521** [0.137]
SE not bailed out (IT)	0.700 [0.205]	1.043 [0.289]	0.782 [0.271]
French	0.794 [0.249]	0.792 [0.215]	0.458** [0.168]
African	0.611*** [0.115]	0.496*** [0.0995]	0.431*** [0.126]
Constant	1.287*** [0.106]	1.056 [0.0712]	0.604*** [0.0573]
Observations	1,105	1,468	970

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard Errors in brackets

Note: Models control for the skill requirements of the occupation

Table 5. Callback Probabilities (Odds Ratios) by Region of Descent. Southern European Descendants Disaggregated by Country

VARIABLES	Germany odds ratio	Netherlands odds ratio	Norway odds ratio
Descent (ref. Native)			
Greek	0.857 [0.248]	0.597* [0.176]	0.442** [0.170]
Spanish	1.249 [0.395]	0.550** [0.155]	0.601 [0.209]
Italian	0.700 [0.205]	1.043 [0.289]	0.781 [0.271]
French	0.795 [0.249]	0.792 [0.215]	0.459** [0.168]
African	0.611*** [0.115]	0.496*** [0.0995]	0.431*** [0.126]
Constant	1.288*** [0.106]	1.056 [0.0712]	0.606*** [0.0574]
Observations	1,105	1,468	970


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard Errors in brackets

Note: Models control for the skill requirements of the occupation

Figure 1. Elsevier Weekblad cover headline “Not another penny to Southern Europe”, 30th May 2020




Figure 2. Callback Probabilities and Significant Ratios by Descent and Country. Southern European Descendants combined



*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: IT=Italy, GR=Greece, ES=Spain. Call Back Ratios (CBR) for significant effects in parenthesis (numerator is native descendants). Significant tests from models in Table 2

Figure 3. Callback Probabilities and Significant Ratios by Descent and Country. Southern European Descendants Disaggregated



*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: Call Back Ratios (CBR) for significant effects in parenthesis (numerator is native descendants). Significant tests from models in Tables 3 and 4.

APPENDIX. Callback Estimates based on Linear Probability Models

Table A1. Linear Probability Estimates (OLS) of Callback by Region of Descent. Southern European Descendants Combined

VARIABLES	Germany OLS	Netehrlands OLS	Norway OLS
Descent (ref. Native)			
Southern European	-0.0273 [0.0449]	-0.0861** [0.0416]	-0.113** [0.0457]
French	-0.0570 [0.0780]	-0.0574 [0.0668]	-0.162** [0.0727]
African	-0.123*** [0.0464]	-0.171*** [0.0479]	-0.172*** [0.0571]
Constant	0.563*** [0.0203]	0.514*** [0.0167]	0.378*** [0.0215]
Observations	1,105	1,468	970
R-squared	0.007	0.020	0.018

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard Errors in brackets

Note: Models control for the skill requirements of the occupation

Table A2. Linear Probability Estimates of Callback by Region of Descent. Southern European Descendants Disaggregated by Bailed-Out Status

VARIABLES	Germany OLS	Netehrlands OLS	Norway OLS
Descent (ref. Native)			
SE bailed out (GR & ES)	0.00468 [0.0538]	-0.137*** [0.0503]	-0.139** [0.0540]
SE not bailed out (IT)	-0.0888 [0.0726]	0.0104 [0.0678]	-0.0563 [0.0770]
French	-0.0571 [0.0779]	-0.0573 [0.0668]	-0.162** [0.0727]
African	-0.123*** [0.0463]	-0.171*** [0.0479]	-0.172*** [0.0571]
Constant	0.563*** [0.0203]	0.514*** [0.0167]	0.377*** [0.0215]
Observations	1,105	1,468	970
R-squared	0.008	0.022	0.018

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard Errors in brackets

Note: Models control for the skill requirements of the occupation

Table A3. Linear Probability Estimates (OLS) of Callback by Region of Descent.
Southern European Descendants Disaggregated by Country

VARIABLES	Germany OLS	Netherlands OLS	Norway OLS
Descent (ref. Native)			
Greek	-0.0383 [0.0719]	-0.127* [0.0716]	-0.167** [0.0752]
Spanish	0.0535 [0.0763]	-0.146** [0.0678]	-0.112 [0.0735]
Italian	-0.0887 [0.0726]	0.0104 [0.0678]	-0.0564 [0.0770]
French	-0.0570 [0.0780]	-0.0573 [0.0668]	-0.162** [0.0727]
African	-0.123*** [0.0464]	-0.171*** [0.0479]	-0.172*** [0.0571]
Constant	0.563*** [0.0203]	0.514*** [0.0167]	0.377*** [0.0215]
Observations	1,105	1,468	970
R-squared	0.009	0.022	0.019

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard Errors in brackets

Note: Models control for the skill requirements of the occupation

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