

Studying Discrimination (1)

Socio-Demography: Mind the Gap

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Discrimination & Inequality Lab



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Outline

1. Intro: What is discrimination?
2. Types of D (theory)
 1. Taste based D
 2. Statistical D
 3. Consumer-driven D
 4. Implicit-bias
3. The limitations of observational data to study LMD
 - The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method
4. Q&A

Discrimination

- Discrimination (D) is both unjust and inefficient. It hurts people, it heightens inequality and it hampers economic growth
- Discriminatory behaviours take many forms, but they all involve unequal treatment + (often) some form of exclusion or rejection
- Many basis for D → e.g. age, gender, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, phenotype, looks, etc
- Many realms and agents of D
- ...but researchers concerned with socio-economic inequality typically focus on...
 1. D in access to crucial assets/resources (e.g. D against minority children in schools, housing market, etc)
 2. D in the labor market (DLM) (e.g. access to employment, promotion opportunities and pay)



D in the labour market (LMD) is the main focus of today's talk



D is only but one possible explanation of LM gaps



As we will see, estimating **D** is a complex task

2. Types of labour market **D**

Theory



Theories of LMD focus on discriminatory practices by firms (employers, managers & directors) in hiring, promoting and paying workers from specific social groups (e.g. women, ethnic/racial minorities)

Types of LMD

1. Discrimination by taste (Becker 1993[1964])

- Firms discriminate against particular groups (e.g. women/minorities) due to
 1. the firms' (i.e. employers) dislike for them
 2. the firms' employees' dislike for them
 3. The firm's customers dislike for them
- In the literature DbT is often used as referring only to 1) but Becker spoke of the three forms (I follow the conventional view and treat consumer-driven D as a different case below)
- Because D by taste is based on prejudice, it is **irrational** from an economic point of view
 - In equilibrium competitive markets should penalize firms that discriminate by taste → This is actually not the case in consumer-driven D

Types of LMD

2. Statistical discrimination (Arrow 1971; Phelps 1972; Aigner and Cain 1977)

- Under incomplete/asymmetric information, rational employers might still discriminate against individuals from some groups if such groups are believed to be...
 - 1) *on average* less productive (e.g. some international migrants in communicational-intensive tasks) –or having a higher average probability of interrupting their careers (e.g. women) OR...
 - 2) If the *variance* in the distribution of unobserved skills is expected to differ by group (e.g. more dispersion in motivation) OR...
 - 3) If the signal employers receive for judging expected productivity is noisier for some groups (e.g. test scores from foreign schools)

Types of LMD

2. Statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973; Aigner and Cain 1977)

- Statistical D is based on information deficits, not taste
- Yet employers' assessments of the distribution of unobserved qualities are often based on biased beliefs (stereotypes)
 - Processes of status categorization typically involved in stereotypes (i.e. beliefs about performance, behaviours, capabilities → e.g. “gypsies are lazy”; “women can’t handle pressure”...)
 - Stereotypes are widely shared by members of the in-group/dominant culture/majority population
 - D reinforces stereotyping because people interpret differences in outcomes as proof of their prior stereotypical beliefs
- IMPLICATION: Yet for stat-D theory, reducing information deficits should always reduce D

Types of LMD

3. Customer-driven discrimination

- Rational firms might still discriminate against particular individuals to comply with customers/clients own prejudiced preferences
 - Example: British Oil companies working in the Persian Gulf did not hire women not to upset their main clients
- This is a situation where firms rationally adapt to their costumers' irrational tastes (this is why it is considered distinct from DbT)
- Recent experiments with employers suggest customer-driven discrimination plays a significant role in shaping employers' decisions (Baert & De Pauw 2014)


Types of LMD

4. Implicit bias

- Note both DbT and Stat D imply conscious assessments of the applicants' qualities by employers
- But research in cognitive and social psychology shows people often categorize, stereotype and D others on the basis of implicit mental associations of which they are largely (if not fully) unaware (see e.g. Richeson and Sommers 2015; Phelps and Thomas 2003; Reskin 2000)
- Evolutionary psychologists argue that the “computational machinery” that triggers race, sex and age categorization & stereotyping of others is a universal feature of human cognition, which can be explained by its adaptive function (see e.g. discussion in Kurzban et al. 2001; Neuberg and Schaller 2016)
 - Age, gender, and race would be “primitive” dimensions which the mind activates in an automatic and mandatory fashion when encountering others

IMPLICATION: D might be harder to eradicate

A very long human evolution



IMPLICATIONS

- Human males and females transmitted their genes under different reproductive circumstances. Genetic adaptation in prehistory led to sexual dimorphism → **sex-specific traits** (i.e. nurturance vs aggressiveness and competition)
- The capacity to recognize outgroup members and to predict their behaviour was crucial for survival under extremely harsh and competitive conditions → **outgroup recognition**
- The ability to recognize healthy and potentially fertile mates → **age recognition**

→ Age, sexual and phenotypic categorization are “primitive” dimensions of cognition operating in the ‘automatic’ area of our brains (where thinking fast takes place) → Little conscious control over age, sex, and phenotypic categorization → Strong forces leading to implicit bias (but see e.g. Reskin 2000; Vaisey 2009; for a “cultural” version of implicit bias)

3. The limitations of observational data



Can we measure D quantitatively using
observational data (i.e. surveys)?



NO, we cannot *because...*



...surveys do not contain all the
characteristics that employers observe
when hiring, promoting, or setting
wages...



Hence we can never be
sure that the minority and non-minority
workers compared are truly similar




In other words, we face the problem of **unobserved confounders** (also known as unobserved heterogeneity) and this **hinders causal identification**

A graphical representation of OVB


$$Y = \alpha + \beta X + \mathbf{G}_Y + \varepsilon$$

Key ID assumption: $\text{Cov}(X, \varepsilon) = 0$

Remember ε
captures all other
unobserved
factors affecting Y



A graphical representation of OVB




Now the effect of Z on Y is “hidden” in the effect of X on Y...
This means $\text{Cov}(X, \varepsilon) \neq 0$

The ID logic in observational research

- We attempt to ID by **controlling** for as many confounders as we can possibly think of (i.e. to convert Zs to Gs in our graphic example)
- When we control for confounders we are **blocking** their effects on X

A graphical representation of OVB



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The ID logic in observational research

- We attempt to ID by **controlling** for as many confounders as we can possibly think of (i.e. to convert Zs to Gs in our graphic example)
- When we control for confounders we are **blocking** their effects on X
- So ID is “achieved” by “netting out” the effect of X from the effect of potential confounders
- Problem is many confounders cannot be observed, and others we cannot think of
- So **ID is problematic** (note IV approaches must also make assumptions about the exogeneity of the instrument)
- ID of hiring D with observational data is also particularly problematic because we typically sample the “wrong” subjects (employees)



Standard LM surveys typically focus on the supply-side (i.e. employees) but it is employers who make hiring decisions
→ i.e. researchers often test demand-side theories with supply-side data!

An illustration of the limitations of observational data

The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method*

*I use the example of the gender age gap but the method can be (and has been) applied in multiple studies of ethnic and racial pay gaps.

Wage decomposition (Oaxaca-Blinder)

Men's factual earnings →

$$S_i^{\text{♂}} = \beta_i^{\text{♂}} X_i^{\text{♂}} + e_i^{\text{♂}} \text{ (i.e. the wages men really get in the LM)}$$

Women's factual earnings →

$$S_i^{\text{♀}} = \beta_i^{\text{♀}} X_i^{\text{♀}} + e_i^{\text{♀}} \text{ (i.e. the wages women really get in the LM)}$$

Women's counterfactual earnings →

$$S_i^{*\text{♀}} = \beta_i^{\text{♂}} X_i^{\text{♀}} + e_i^{\text{♀}} \text{ (i.e. what women would get in a neutral LM)}$$

$$\underbrace{S_i^{\text{♂}} - S_i^{\text{♀}}}_{\text{Gross wage gap}} = \underbrace{\beta_i^{\text{♂}} (X_i^{\text{♂}} - X_i^{\text{♀}})}_{\text{Differences in assests}} + \underbrace{(\beta_i^{\text{♂}} - \beta_i^{\text{♀}}) X_i^{\text{♀}}}_{\text{Differences in returns}}$$

Gross wage gap =

Differences in assests + Differences in returns

Explained component + Unexplained component

**(This has often been
interpreted as capturing
discrimination)**

The problem is...

- The effect of any unobserved characteristic affecting wage differences that is not captured by the explained component will necessarily appear in the residual component!!

An example from Farkas & Vicknair (1996)

558

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 1. Coefficients from Regression of (ln) Hourly Wage on Selected Independent Variables, and Percent of Wage Gap Explained: Full-Time Black Male Workers, Ages 26 to 33 in 1991

Independent Variable	Mean Difference (Black minus White)	Coefficients		Percent of Wage Gap Explained	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Cognitive skill (1980)	-1.000	—	.109***	—	40.43
Years of school	-.627	.069***	.045***	16.11	10.41
Work experience (weeks)	-75.861	.001***	.001***	22.48	22.48
Mother's education (years)	-1.255	.013*	.010	6.18	4.56
Age in 1979	-.110	-.002	-.007	-.07	-.29
Lives in rural area	-.122	-.019	-.016	-.86	-.74
Lives in the South	.320	-.168**	-.166**	19.91	19.68
Health limitation	-.005	-.038	-.050	-.07	-.10
Married	-.219	.179***	.164***	14.52	13.30
Grew up in South	.341	-.014	.014	1.80	-1.73
Number of children under age 18	.304	-.012	-.007	1.36	.81
Has preschool child	.045	.022	.006	-.36	-.09
R ² (adjusted)	—	.274	.295	—	—
Total	—	—	—	80.99	108.72

100-(Total)=
% unexplained




Note: The mean of the dependent variable for this sample is 6.75. The dependent variable is $\ln(100 \times \text{dollars per hour})$. The sample size is 602.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

The problem is...

- The effect of any unobserved characteristic affecting wage differences that is not captured by the explained component will necessarily appear in the residual component!!



D cannot be properly identified with observational data

Qs

1. List a few relevant confounders in the study of gender pay gaps
2. And what confounders you think might be relevant in the study of native/migrant gaps?
3. Are all unobserved variables correlated with gender/ethnicity “confounders”? How can you differentiate a confounder from a mechanism?

That's all

Many thanks for your attention!

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